作者：Daniel Larimer
發表時間：2019-10-15
翻譯&註釋：Ponge，百度翻譯
區塊鏈治理的目的是維護儘可能多數人的最佳利益下進行決策，同時儘量減少一小部分人以犧牲社羣利益的方式行事的可能性。區塊鏈治理的關鍵是要協調利益並選出如果網路無法發揮其潛力時損失最大的一方。真正的股權證明（PoS）要與長期利益一致，並將控制權交給那些有長期承諾的人。
The purpose of blockchain governance is to make decisions in the best interest of as many people as possible while minimizing the opportunity for a small group of people to act in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of the community. The key is to align interests and select the parties with the most to lose if the network fails to operate to its potential. True proof of stake aligns long term interests and puts control in the hands of those with a long term commitment.
從可以客觀證明的角度，我們可以保守地假設投票給區塊生產者（BP）的所有賬戶都歸區塊生產者（BP）所有。我們也可以將投票和“買票”看作是區塊生產者（BP）為了獲得前N名資格進行的“租用股份”行為。由於（BP）租借（股份）和賣出一份免信任的（trustless）回購協議 [1] 兩者沒有什麼區別，因此“買票”（譯者注：或者貶義地，“賄選”）沒有任何不道德之處，試圖阻止這項活動實際上是對所有權的潛在侵犯。
From the perspective of what can be proven objectively, we can conservatively assume all accounts which vote for a producer are owned by the producer. We can also view votes and “vote buying” as nothing short of “renting stake” for the purpose of qualifying for the top N. Since there is little difference between renting and selling with a trustless repurchase agreement, there is nothing immoral with this activity and attempts to prevent it are in fact a potential violation of ownership rights.
為了確保長期前景和“利益一致” [2]，只有鎖定在長期質押合約中的通證才有資格投票。人們因質押獲得的收益是其流動性損失的補償，並且收益應與通證被鎖定的時間長度成正比。通證（基於市場決定的利率）被鎖定時間儘可能的長，對於通證網路來說是最好的。
To ensure a long-term outlook and “skin in the game”, only tokens locked in a long-term staking contract qualify for voting. The yield someone earns for staking compensates them for the loss of liquidity and should be proportional to the length of time the tokens are locked up. It is best for the network for tokens to be locked as long as possible based upon market determined rates of interest.
因此，我提議創設6個質押池：3個月、6個月、12個月、2年、5年和10年。在通證供應量為10億的網路中，每個池每年將以分鐘為單位，累計收到500萬個通證（假設網路執行100%可靠）。使用者可以將通證投入質押池，根據佔質押池的比例獲得該池的收入。使用者的投票權重則是基於每個質押池佔比的加總。這意味著網路存在3%的年通脹率，通脹部分支付給不同的質押池。
Therefore, I propose the creation of 6 staking pools: 3 month, 6 month, 12 month, 2 year, 5 year, and 10 year. In a network with a token supply of 1B, each pool will receive 5M tokens per year on a minute by minute basis (assuming network is operating at 100% reliability). Users can buy into the pool to receive their pro-rata share of that pools income. A user’s vote-weight is based upon the sum of their percentage ownership of each pool. This represents a 3% annual inflation paid to the different staking pools.
質押部分在全週期上至多按周為單位釋放，流通部分可以贖回 [3]。 比如，質押在3個月質押池中的通證每週可以釋放約7%，質押在10年質押池中的通證每週可以釋放0.2% [4]。
Funds can be withdrawn from the pool at most one a week. Stake in a 3 month pool could be withdrawn at about 7% per week. Stake in a 10 year pool could be withdrawn at 0.2% per week.
質押池中的通證會從“資源”池中剔除，因此這部分不能借給資源交易所（REX），這會增加REX中所有通證的單位頻寬。質押池可以被看作債券 [5]， 同時該部分通證會退出流通市場，並在未來某個時候恢復流通，同時獲得通脹帶來的利息。
Tokens in a stake pool are taken out of the “resource” pool so cannot be lent to the REX, this increases the bandwidth per token for all tokens in the REX. The staking pools can be viewed as a bond where the tokens are taken out of circulation now and returned to circulation with added interest from inflation at some point in the future.
只要你的通證仍然在一個質押池，這些通證就可以獲取利息，利息等於每一個質押池的通證獎勵乘以使用者在該池的通證佔該質押池質押總量的比例 [6]。
So long as your tokens remain in a staking pool they will have their interest compound at a rate proportional to the total amount of stake in each pool.
通證可以從短期質押池轉移到長期質押池，不會有任何延遲。 因此，你可以在任何時候將3個月質押池中的通證100%轉移到10年質押池中；但是，你不能從10年質押池轉移到較短期限的質押池，每週解禁的0.2%除外。
Tokens can move from a shorter term to a longer term without any delay. So you can move 100% of your 3 month stake to a 10 year stake at any time; however, you cannot move from a 10 year to a shorter term except at the rate of 0.2% per week.
這種質押系統的結果是，市場的力量將會基於權力渴望和流動性的權衡構造收益率曲線。 很少有人願意放棄10年的流動性，所以他們將獲得更高的相對收益，並在網路中擁有更大的權力。更多的人願意放棄3個月的流動性，因此他們將獲得更低的收益和更少的權力。
The outcome of this staking system is that market forces will set the yield curve based upon balancing the desire for power and liquidity. Few people will want to give up liquidity for 10 years so they will earn a higher relative yield and more power over the network. More people will be willing to give up liquidity for 3 months, so they will get a lower yield and less power.
一旦每個人都進行了抵押和投票，21個區塊生產者（BP）將在“一票一投”的基礎上被選中（投票權重按通證質押在各個質押池的比例加權）。這些區塊生產者（BP）將按他們獲得的選票比例獲得獎勵，而不是以出塊作為基礎。向區塊生產者（BP）支付與它們選票呈線性關係以外的額外部分，將鼓勵女巫攻擊 [7]。這將導致權力愈發中心化，而不是不同的21方。當一個人試圖控制兩個或多個節點時，事實上整個網路只有20個或更少的節點。
Once everyone has staked and voted, 21 block producers will be selected on a “one token one vote” basis (weighted by percent of pool tokens are staked in). These producers will be paid proportionally to the votes they receive instead of on a per-block basis. Paying block producers anything other than a linear relationship to their votes will incentives a sybil attack and result in increased centralization of power instead of 21 distinct parties, there may only be 20 or less with one person attempting to control two or more slots.
區塊生產者（BP）的獎勵應減少到每年僅佔通證供應量的0.5%（按全球可靠性貼現）。最終，最大的利益相關者可能會控制哪些是區塊生產者（BP）；因此，質押池的收益可能會和出塊獎勵流向同一批人——執行BP的人。
Producer rewards should be minimized to just 0.5% of token supply per year (discounted by global reliability). Ultimately, the largest stakeholders will likely control who the producers are; therefore, the yield paid to the staking pools is likely flowing to most of the same people who are running the producers.
如果網路不能確保可靠地生產區塊，世界上所有的去中心化專案對任何人都沒有幫助；因此，整個網路的通脹率需要加上一個係數，係數等於7日平均可用性（7-day average availability）的10次方。如果7DAA=99%，整個網路的通脹率為最大膨脹率3.5%的90%（譯者注：0.9910≈0.9044）。如果一個區塊生產者（BP）開始丟塊，可靠性下降到97%，那麼每個人的收益率降到最大收益率的73%（譯者注：0.9710≈0.7374）。這意味著，如果選民（質押者）不投票給可靠的區塊生產者（BP），他們將受到懲罰。
All the decentralization in the world helps no one if the network cannot ensure that blocks are produced reliably; therefore, all inflation is scaled by the 7 day average availability raised to the 10th power. At 99% reliability the total inflation will be 90% of the max inflation of 3.5%. If a producer starts missing blocks and reliability falls to 97% then everyone’s yield falls to 73% of maximum yield. This means that voters (stakers) are punished if they don’t vote for reliable producers.
預期成果 Expected Outcome
交易所將無法使用使用者通證進行投票，因為大部分控制權都與長期的質押合約有關。採用一票一投模式，按票數比例支付獎勵，將結束兩個區塊生產者（BP）由一個人經營的局面。採用質押通證才能投票的方式，我們可以保證每個想成為區塊生產者（BP）的人和網路“利益一致”，也可以保證即使最後一名區塊生產者（BP）也會是可靠的。或許更吸引人的結果之一是真正的基於市場的利率和收益率曲線的形成機制。小利益相關方可以透過參與長期質押池獲得額外的影響力和更高的收益。
Exchanges would be unable to vote with user tokens because most of the control is tied up in long-term staking contracts. With one token one vote model and pay proportional to votes it would end the situation of two producers are operated by one individual. With only staked tokens voting we assure that everyone seeking to be a producer has skin in the game and that even the lowest producer slot is likely to be reliable. Perhaps one of the more fascinating outcomes is the discovery of a true market-based interest rate and yield curve. Smaller stakeholders can gain extra influence and higher yields by participating in the long-term staking pools.
資源交易所（REX）將定義最短期限（3天）的質押池收益率，REX中的通證將不再擁有投票權。那些尋求收益的人應該轉移到質押池。
The REX will define the yield on the shortest term (3-day) staking pool and tokens in the REX would no longer having voting rights. Those seeking yield should move to the staking pools instead.
本提案中的所有內容都是供社羣考慮的，或許是許多可行的解決方案之一。
Everything in this proposal is for community consideration and may be one of many viable solutions.
免責宣告：這篇文章中的一切都是我的意見，而不是我的僱主（Block.one）的意見。不要假設本帖子中的任何內容會被任何區塊鏈實現或採用。我沒有考慮該提案的任何法律或稅務後果，所以請在採用前諮詢相關顧問。
Disclaimer: Everything in this post is my opinion and not that of my employer. Do not assume anything in this post will be implemented or adopted by any blockchain. I have not considered any legal or tax consequences of the proposed design, so please consult relevant advisors before moving forward.
註釋：
- 正常的回購協議是指賣方以一定規模的資產作為抵押融入資金，並承諾在日後再購回所抵押資產的交易行為。這裡的免信任的回購協議，則可以理解為不需要抵押資產就可以融入資金（EOS），並在日後把本金（EOS）和利息（投票返利）返給買方（持幣人）的行為。
- skin in the game 據說是巴菲特首先提出來的，原指公司高層管理層自掏腰包買下公司股票的情況，以確保公司由利害與共的人來管理。後來納西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布（著有《隨機漫步的傻瓜》、《黑天鵝》、《反脆弱》等書），出了一本書，就叫做《skin in the game》，有人翻譯成《入局——生活中隱藏的不對稱性》。
- 可以理解為，質押池內部的Token等於股票，相當於該網路管理層skin in the game。股票的鎖定期越長，投票權重越大。
- 三個月按90天計算，釋放100%，則每1天釋放1.11%，每7天合計釋放7.78%；10年共520周，釋放100%，每週釋放0.1923%。
- 在這個維度上，6個質押池等價於6個不同期限的債券，即EOS網路上3個月、6個月、12個月、2年、5年和10年債券，債券利率由網路內部市場決定，成為該網路的無風險收益率，最終應該能形成類似於國債的利率期限結構。
- 舉例：一年共525,600分鐘，每分鐘每個質押池釋放9.5129個EOS。每分鐘利息為（Sn為第n個質押池）：
I=\sum_{n=1}^{6}(9.5129\times\frac{user's\quad tokens\quad in\quad S_n }{total\quad amount\quad of\quad token\quad in\quad S_n})
- 女巫攻擊指個人試圖透過建立多個帳戶身份，多個節點或電腦座標從而控制網路，可以參考幣安學院：女巫攻擊。
